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For You Alone? Dual-Investor Theory and Fiduciary
Relationships
Eugene Schlossberger*

I. INTRODUCTION

Fiduciary relationships have become increasingly important in professional
ethics. According to Mark Rodwin, "[t]he idea that physicians are or should be
fiduciaries for their patients ... is a dominant metaphor in medical ethics and law

today."' He further notes that "[t]he American College of Physicians declares that
the physician is the advocate and champion of his patient, upholding the patient's
interest above all others" and that "members of the American College of
Surgeons pledge to place the welfare of [their] patients above all else.",2 Lester
Brickman avers that "[t]he attorney-client relationship typifies a fiduciary
relationship" and notes that "fiduciary obligations imposed on the lawyer include
the duties of confidentiality, loyalty, safeguarding property, giving disinterested
advice, and acting fairly towards the client."3 Joel Block points out that "CPAs
may be considered fiduciaries to their clients when they render a variety of
services including tax services, asset management and general business
consulting" Fiduciary models have been invoked for a wide variety of fields and
occupations,
including government
officials,5 business and corporate managers,6
•
7
8
engineers, real estate appraisers, and plumbers.9
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The traditional notion of a fiduciary relationship protects client interests
against the fiduciary's contrary interests, e.g., requiring attorneys to advise
clients about fee arrangements even when such advice adversely affects the
attorney's financial interests.'" More problematically, the prevailing notion of
fiduciary relationships also protects the interests of clients against all others. This
second aspect of the prevailing notion, requiring fiduciaries to exercise their
powers exclusively for the benefit of the client," often conflicts with broader
social aims and values. The prevailing conception requires a wide range of what
might be called "zealous duties" (patterned after the phrase "zealous advocacy").
Zealous duties are fiduciary obligations to act on behalf of clients in ways that
would be wrong for the fiduciary to do for himself or herself (pro se), that is, to
advance client interests by means that would ordinarily be unjust, unfair, or
contrary to public welfare.
Zealous duties raise moral and legal questions. To what extent should the law
permit or even require zealous duties? It might seem tempting to say that the law
permits (or, in some cases, requires) fiduciaries to pursue their clients' interests
in ways that, even if immoral, are not illegal when done pro se. However, the law
grants some fiduciary relationships special immunities. Attorneys must keep
confidential some client admissions that other citizens would be required to
divulge. Conversely, an ordinary citizen does not have a legal duty to warn when
hearing someone threaten to commit suicide, but a therapist does.'2 Thus it is
merely a rough rule of thumb, with important exceptions, that the law permits
fiduciaries to pursue clients' interests in just those ways that are not illegal pro
se. It may be asked, then, both whether the law should require (and not merely
permit) more or fewer obligations within those limits and whether the law should
recognize more exceptions (thus either limiting or expanding zealous duties).
Additionally, granted that fiduciaries should generally observe their legal duties,
is it morally wrong, in the absence of a legal duty, for a fiduciary to pursue client
advantage in ways that would be wrong for the fiduciary to do pro se?
Dual-Investor theory, which holds that society is an investor in all business
ventures (including law firms and medical practices), casts some light on these
issues. Dual-Investor theory received a brief articulation in 19933 and a detailed

9. See AM. SOC'Y OF PLUMBING ENG'RS, PLUMBING ENG'R'S VOLUNTARY CODE OF ETHICS (2001)
(adopted Oct. 28, 2000), http://aspe.org/_OLD/AboutASPE/aspe-ethics/CodeofEthics.pdf (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
10. See Usipuik v. Jensen, Mitchell & Co., [1986] B.C.L.R.2d 283, 292-93 (Can.); see also Brickman,
supra note 3, at 1209.
11.

See, e.g., MARY C. HURLEY, LIBRARY OF PARLIAMENT, THE CROWN'S FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP

WITH ABORIGINAL PEOPLES 2 (2000) (rev. 2002), http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/library/PRBpubs/ prbOO09e.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
12. See Eugene Schlossberger & Loma Hecker, HIV and Family Therapists' Duty to Warn: A Legal and
Ethical Analysis, 22 J. MARITAL & FAM. THERAPY 27 (1996).
13. See EUGENE SCHLOSSBERGER, THE ETHICAL ENGINEER (1993) [hereinafter SCHLOSSBERGER, THE
ETHICAL ENGINEER].
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exposition and justification in 1994.' 4 The concept of stakeholder as shareholder
has also been employed by Margaret Blair'5 and others.' 6 While less well known
than classic stakeholder and shareholder theories, some research indicates DualInvestor theory is more convincing to business students. 7 The basic idea behind
Dual-Investor theory is that every business venture makes essential use of goods
and services provided by society.'8 For example, modem businesses can function
only by making extensive use of an available knowledge base, provided, at great
cost, by previous generations and contemporary researchers whose work is often
subsidized directly or indirectly by society." Henry Ford did not begin by reinventing the wheel in his basement. Similarly, businesses rely upon roads and
transportation networks, currency systems, educational systems, water supply
systems, and police protection, whose considerable costs are borne by society.
These assets provided by society, which may collectively be termed "opportunity
capital," are as essential to a business as the specific capital provided by ordinary
investors such as stockholders. 21 Thus every business venture can be regarded as
"owned" by two categories of investors: "shareholders, who provide the specific
capital for the enterprise, and society, which provides the opportunity capital for
the venture. 22 The venture thus owes a good return on its investment to both
categories of investors, namely, ordinary shareholders and society. Business
ventures can often meet their obligations to society simply by being good
corporate citizens. 2' A grocery store that treats its customers and employees fairly
and well, does not illegally dump refuse, and so forth, gives society a return on
its investment: it pays taxes, provides employment, and offers a convenient way
for residents to meet their nutritional needs.2 4 Dual-Investor theory does place
some limits on the normal pursuit of profit. 25 For instance, Dual-Investor theory
ordinarily proscribes marginally increasing profit by omitting, without
consumers' knowledge, an inexpensive but life-saving safety device or gouging
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Ethics, 2 TEACHING BUS. ETHICS 127 (1998) [hereinafter Schlossberger, The Middle Path].
18. Schlossberger, A New Model of Business, supra note 14, at 461.
19. Id. at 461.
20. Id.
21.

Id.

22.
23.
24.
25.

Schlossberger, The Middle Path, supra note 17, at 128.
Schlossberger, A New Model of Business, supra note 14, at 469-70.
Id.
See id. at 469-7 1.
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consumers who have no choice but to pay.26 However, to a large extent,
businesses that operate in good faith can concentrate on attending to business.
Dual-Investor theory urges fiduciaries to maintain a similar balance between
client and public interests. 27 Clients and fiduciaries are both indebted to society
for providing the knowledge base and other investments of which both have
made heavy use in order to become, respectively, a client and a fiduciary. For
example, when either the client or the fiduciary is a legal or medical practice,
society is an investor in that practice. Moreover, society maintains institutions
enabling the establishment and conducting of fiduciary relationships, and hence
the very existence of the fiduciary relationship between client and fiduciary
would not exist without the contributions of society. At the very least, the "no
bite" principle (named after the phrase "don't bite the hand that feeds you"),
which holds that it is ceteris paribus wrong to turn legitimate assistance offered
against the one who offers the assistance, 21 suggests that the fiduciary's pursuit of
client interest should not be to the detriment of society. On a variety of grounds,
then, Dual-Investor theory requires fiduciaries to balance social welfare against
the pursuit of client interest.
Public fiduciaries, for the most part, face relatively few conflicts between
their clients' interests and the public interest, since their clients are, usually, the
public itself; although, for example, a government social worker may bear some
fiduciary duty to a program beneficiary whose relevant interests may conflict
with those of the general public. Privately owned fiduciary concerns, in contrast,
frequently bear fiduciary duties to non-public clients whose interests may conflict
with the public interest, with the interests of third parties, or with basic values
and the demands of fairness. Physicians bear fiduciary duties to individual
patients whose interests and needs may conflict with the needs of non-patients
and/or the requirements of fair dealing. Similarly, attorneys representing private
clients bear fiduciary duties to those clients and a managerial accountant may
bear fiduciary duties to a corporation or limited partnership. Nonetheless, private
fiduciaries generally operate as part of a business venture, and so, if DualInvestor theory is correct, bear a responsibility to society as well as to the client.
Of course, since most fiduciary practices, such as medicine and law, provide an
important social service, fiduciaries often provide a return on society's
investment simply by being faithful fiduciaries to their clients. For example,
society as a whole benefits from the institution of medicine in which physicians
attend faithfully to the medical needs of individual patients. While Dual-Investor
theory places some limits on the normal pursuit of clients' interests, fiduciaries
that play fair can, to a large extent, concentrate on attending to their clients'

26. See Schlossberger, The Middle Path, supra note 17, at 133-34.
27. See id.
28. For more on the "no bite" principle and its application to organizations, see Eugene Schlossberger,
The Moral Duties of Organizations:Dual-InvestorTheory and the Nature of Organizations,in JOHN R. ROWAN
& SAMUEL ZINAICH, JR., ETHICS FOR THE PROFESSIONS 173 (2003).
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needs. However, there are important exceptions: situations can arise in which a
fiduciary's ordinary pursuit of a client's interests conflicts with a strong public
interest or ordinary morality.
Accordingly, there are two regions in which Dual-Investor theory tends to
conflict with the prevailing fiduciary model: unethical pursuit of a client's
interests and major conflicts between the client's and the public's interest. These
two areas will be the focus of this article. Should (or may) the normal operation
of a fiduciary in pursuing clients' benefits be exploitive or unfair to others?
Should (or may) the ordinarily reasonable duties to a client's interest be
subordinated to the public interest? Dual-Investor theory, by suggesting that
fiduciaries must balance client and public interests, limits the range and extent of
zealous duties. The prevailing concept of a fiduciary relationship must be
amended, with appropriate changes in law, medicine, and other fields. More
broadly, pragmatic factors that have led to the predominance in professional
ethics of the prevailing concept should also be addressed. Some general
considerations that touch upon these topics are raised in Part II. Part III examines
test cases, while Part IV looks at trends and pragmatic ramifications of DualInvestor theory.
II. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
Given that professionals must balance serving society against serving the
client whom they are paid to represent, there is no general reason to think that a
defensible weighting always favors the client. Particular exceptions already occur
in existing U.S. law. Physicians in most states are required to report bullet
wounds.29 Similarly, as noted above, therapists in most U.S. jurisdictions have a
duty to warn when a client or patient poses a danger to others."' However, these
legal exceptions are generally conceived as specific limitations upon the
fiduciary relationship, which is held to be devoted exclusively to the benefit of
the client. Attorneys, for example, must zealously represent their clients'
interests, subject only to clearly defined restrictions that are relatively few in
number and limited to extreme cases. Thus there is a natural alliance between the
prevailing conception of the fiduciary relationship, invoking a broad range of
zealous duties, and the use of strict rules. By contrast, a hundred years ago,
attorneys were asked to balance being an advocate for the client against being an
officer of the court, representing justice. On this view, the professional plays a

29. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.20(b) (2003) (requiring physicians to report "every case of a
bullet wound, gunshot wound, powder burn or any other injury arising from or caused by, or appearing to arise
from or be caused by, the discharge of a gun or firearm"); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12A (West 2003)
("[Tihe manager, superintendent or other person in charge thereof, shall report [bullet wounds] at once to the
colonel of the state police and to the police of the town where such physician, hospital, sanatorium or institution
is located .... ").
30. See supranote 12 and accompanying text.
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dual role, representing not only the client but also the underlying values of a
social institution. Architects, for example, must balance loyalty to artistic
standards against the happiness of the clients who must live in the structures they
design. Public relations professionals must balance the interests of the client
against fairness, straightforwardness, and the public's right to know. This dualhat conception of the professional, which requires a constant balancing of
potentially conflicting loyalties, ill suits reliance upon strict rules, calling instead
for the use of discretion within guidelines.
As always, in the conflict between discretion and strict rules, there is a tradeoff. Strict rules offer greater predictability for clients, lessen the burden on
professionals, mitigate the effect of an individual's bad judgment, and lessen the
possibility of abuse (when, as Steven Shavell points out, administrators' aims
diverge from society's).3' They also evidence insensitivity to individual
circumstances, often fly in the face of common sense, and, as Shavell also notes,
cannot employ information not contained in the rules.32 Ideally, then, some
compromise between discretion and rules should be found. While the prevailing
conception is heavily rule-oriented, a Dual-Investor conception of fiduciary
relationships calls for flexibility within guidelines.
Thus the degree to which law and morals should be governed by strict rules
or by a combination of rules, guidelines, and discretion constitutes one test battle
between the prevailing conception of a fiduciary bearing zealous duties and the
Dual-Investor conception requiring balance between client interests, fairness, and
the public interest. Of course, legal reasoning, like moral reasoning, is always a
matter of judgment in balancing diverse factors: discretion and judgment are
ineradicable.33 Conversely, a system based entirely on discretion fails to
constitute the rule of law. It is a matter of degree: should the law be more or less
rule-like.34 The prevailing conception pushes the law far to the rule-like side.
Dual-Investor theory suggests greater balance and moderation.
The complexity of the judgments to be made suggests that too rule-like an
approach is inappropriate. Fiduciaries' zealous pursuit of client interests may be
evaluated in terms of four features (each of which may, in turn, be the resultant
of multiple considerations): the nature of the client interest pursued (whether it is
a legitimate or improper interest), whether the advantage to be gained is an unfair
advantage or an advantage merited by the client, whether the advantage to be
gained by the client is significant (in terms of the value of the benefit, if
achieved, as well as the likelihood of success), and the nature of the means
31. See Steven Shavell, Optimal Discretion in the Application of Rules, 9 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 175,
175-76 (2007).
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1948); Michael Hor,
Corroboration:Rules and Discretion in the Searchfor Truth, 2000 SINGAPORE J. LEGAL STUD. 509; Moris R.
Cohen, Rule Versus Discretion, II J. PHIL. PSYCHOL. & SCI. METHODS 208 (1914).
34. See also EUGENE SCHLOSSBERGER, A HOLISTIC APPROACH TO RIGHTS: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION,
REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, CENSORSHIP, AND FUTURE GENERATIONS (2008).
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employed. For example, a fiduciary's action may constitute a dishonest means of
trivially enhancing the likelihood of obtaining a large, deserved advantage for the
client in support of a legitimate interest. Another fiduciary's action might
constitute a method harmful to a third party of significantly enhancing the
likelihood of obtaining a moderate, unfair advantage for a client in support of a
morally neutral interest. Significantly, there appears to be neither a lexical
ordering of nor a straightforward common scale for gauging the relative strength
of different factors. The unfairness of the advantage gained is not always more
weighty than the legitimacy of the interest served. Thus particular unfair
advantages must be weighed against particular legitimate interests. What scale
might indicate that the unfairness of a particular advantage is worth -3 points
while the legitimacy of a particular interest merits +2 points? It is problematic
enough to develop a scale for measuring the unfairness of different sorts of unfair
advantages, much less a method of comparing an advantage's degree of
unfairness against the weight of an interest's legitimacy. Similarly, the means
taken may be dishonest and also adversely affect a third party (whose relation to
the transaction may be complex). How many units of dishonesty equal one unit
of harm to the third party? By how many units is the harm done lessened by the
degree of the third party's voluntariness in being affected by the fiduciary's
action? Questions of this sort, as the cases in Part III illustrate, suggest that
judgment and discretion are indispensable to setting limits on fiduciary pursuit of
client interest: it seems inappropriate to rely entirely on strictly specified rules.
A second consideration supporting the Dual-Investor conception may be
found in Jewish law. Rabbi Asher Meir points out that, according to Jewish law,
the fiduciary relationship does not protect wrong action, since Jewish law holds
that one may not delegate another to do wrong-it is forbidden for an agent to do
wrong on behalf of a client.35
What arguments can be adduced in support of Jewish law? Shorn of
institutional trappings, Jewish law does not normally approve of doing wrong for
another's benefit. We do not generally regard as permissible a parent's cheating,
lying, or stealing in order to advance the interests of a child. Parents are not
morally justified in stealing the answers to an SAT exam because the theft will
benefit their daughter. Of course, it may be precisely the institutional trappings
that justify zealous duties. If so, the institutional trappings must provide some
special justification that overrides the normal proscription of doing wrong on
another's behalf. Thus a presumption exists against such fiduciary duties: absent
special justification, it is wrong to do wrong for the sake of another. Hence, the
burden of proof lies on those who assert that attorneys or physicians may or
should do what would be wrong pro se in advancing their clients' interests.
What special justifications for fiduciary zealous duties can be given? One
possible justification might be called the "democratic argument." The prevailing

35.

See generally ASHER MEIR, THE JEWISH ETHICIST (2005).
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notion is, by and large, the one that we, as a society, have chosen to adopt for
ourselves through democratically established laws and regulations. The question
remains, however, whether we should so choose. Moreover, laws and regulations
pertaining to attorneys are mostly written by attorneys, and the electorate is, by
and large, both ignorant of those laws and relatively apathetic. Few American
voters are familiar in any detail with their state's laws regarding attorney-client
confidentiality or other limitations on zealous advocacy and, in any case, roughly
half of eligible voters do not participate even in presidential elections.36 Thus,
while, in some sense, the claims made by the democratic argument are correct,
those facts are less indicative of popular approval than of the ignorance and
apathy of voters. It is highly unlikely that laws resembling the ABA Model Rules
would pass in a general referendum.
Perhaps the most obvious line of justification for fiduciary zealous duties
invokes the kind of reasoning John Rawls highlights in Two Concepts of Rules.37

Zealous duties are necessary for the faithful performance of the fiduciary role,
the argument claims, and society benefits by the practice of individuals
performing that role. For example, privileged communications are necessary for
attorneys properly to defend their clients, who may need to reveal commission of
what may be a crime in order to receive proper legal advice. Unless such
admissions to an attorney are privileged, clients will not feel free to reveal the
full set of relevant facts to attorneys, and clients will not receive the best legal
representation. Society is best served by an institution of legal representation.
Thus attorneys should respect client confidences even when keeping silent
would
38
ordinarily be wrong (e.g., entails serious harm to an innocent person).

36. Figures vary, in part, because calculations divide voter turnout by different parameters, for example,
U.S. citizens over the age of eighteen as opposed to total U.S. population over the age of eighteen (including
non-citizens not eligible to vote). The U.S. Census reports that sixty percent of citizens eighteen and older voted
in the 2000 Presidential election. AMIE JAMIESON ET AL., U.S. DEP'T COMMERCE, VOTING AND REGISTRATION
IN THE ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 2000, at 2 (2002), http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/p20-542.pdf (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review). However, only fifty-five percent of the total population (including
noncitizens) voted in the 2000 election. Id. PBS's NOW with Bill Moyers cited 54.4 as the percentage of
eligible voters who voted in 1996, while Infoplease lists the percentage of the U.S. population over eighteen
who voted in 1996 as 49.1. NOW, Politics and Economy, Election 2004, http://www.pbs.org/now/politics
votestats.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2008) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); Infoplease, National Voter
Turnout in Federal Elections: 1960-2006, http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0781453.html (last visited Apr. 6,
2008) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). Similarly, Curtis Gans stated the figure was forty-nine percent
and Bradley Siciliano and Jessica Green describe the figure as "less than half." Breaking News: Election 2000:
Curtis Gans of the Committee for Study of American Electorate Discusses Voter Turnout (CNN television
broadcast Nov. 8, 2000), http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0011/08/bn.08.html (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review); Bradley Siciliano & Jessica Green, Get Out the Vote, GOTHAM GAZETTE, Nov. 6,
2000, http://www.gothamgazette.com/article/issueoftheweek/20001106/200/159 (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review).
37. See John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3 (1955).
38. See Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d 704 (Minn. 1962); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e)
(West 2003 & Supp. 2007) (permitting, but not requiring, disclosure to prevent a criminal act that is likely to
result in death or serious bodily injury). In recent years, exceptions to confidentiality have been broadened. The
2003 amended version of Model Rule 1.6, following, for example, Florida's Rule 4-1.6 and New Mexico's Rule
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It does seem clear that some degree of fiduciary dedication is necessary for
the institutions of law and medicine, but it is far from clear that the stronger
claims required to justify current practices are correct. On what grounds might it
be argued that most clients cannot receive reasonably adequate legal advice if
they do not feel free to reveal the commission of serious crimes or that most
patients cannot receive adequate medical care if their physicians balance their
interests against public health considerations? What evidence exists that the
exceptions to fiduciary zeal already recognized by law have undermined the
practice of law, medicine, or therapy? As a result of physicians' duty to report
bullet wounds, some patients with bullet wounds may avoid medical treatment,
but such instances are rare, mostly involve felons rather than law-abiding
citizens, and seem to have little impact on the ordinary person's use of
physicians. 9 Therapists' duty to warn may occasionally result in a client being
less forthcoming with his or her therapist. Such instances do sometimes include
patients who have the most need to unburden themselves fully. Nonetheless, the
legal imposition of a duty to warn appears to have had little effect on the ordinary
use of therapy. 0 Other societies, including our own in earlier times, have
maintained flourishing systems of law and medicine in the absence of powerful
zealous duties.
Throughout much of our legal history, the evidentiary privilege served as
the only rule restricting attorneys from disclosing information provided
by their clients. Despite exceptions to and limitations on the rule, clients
managed to seek legal assistance and to provide adequate information to
obtain such assistance from their lawyers, with no other assurance
of
4
1
attorney.
the
to
disclosed
information
the
of
use
the
on
restriction
Similarly, while society is clearly better off with the current system of legal
representation than it would be with none, it is not clear that society would suffer
if the current system was replaced with a more limited system of representation
(as was the case in many societies) in which attorneys are required to balance
client interest against the demands of justice. Little but dubious anecdotes or
irrelevant comparisons to straw man alternatives supports the frequently made
claim that the American system of law is the best system yet devised.
16:160, permits disclosure to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm. See MODEL RULES OF
1.6(b)(1) (2006); see also FLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-1.6 (2003 & Supp. 2007)
(requiring a lawyer to reveal information to prevent death or substantial bodily harm); N.M. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 16:160 (2004) (stating that a lawyer should reveal information to prevent a client from committing
a criminal act that is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm).
39. See John P. May et al., Medical Care Solicitation by Criminals with Gunshot Wound Injuries: A
Survey of Washington, DC, Jail Detainees, 48 J. TRAUMA 130 (2000); Howard Ovens, Why Mandatory
PROF'L CONDUCT R.

Reporting of Gunshot Wounds is Necessary, 170 CAN. MED. ASS'N J. 1256, 1257 (2004).

40.
41.
(2002).

See ALAN A. STONE, LAW, PSYCHIATRY, AND MORALITY: ESSAYS AND ANALYSIS 161-91 (1984).
Lloyd B. Snyder, Is Attorney-Client Confidentiality Necessary, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 477, 485
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Interestingly, public perception seems to disagree. For example, the Survey
Research Program at Sam Houston State University's College of Criminal Justice
found that, in 2007, forty-two percent of Texans lacked even "some" confidence
in the adult criminal system, while only forty-five percent of respondents
expressed confidence in the juvenile system. 2 In a 2000 Vermont study, only
forty-six percent said the criminal justice system does a good job.43
In short, the argument appears to be guilty of the fallacy of false dilemma, as
if the only two choices were extreme dedication to the interests of the client
against society or no dedication at all to the client's interests. In fact, there is a
wide range between those extremes, and it is far from clear that picking a more
moderate balance between client interests and justice or social welfare would not
permit attorneys or physicians to play their roles or that the modified institutions
of law and medicine resulting from such changes would leave society worse off.
Until a careful, fallacy-free argument is provided that a system of zealous duties
serves society better than any other, the presumption against doing wrong for the
sake of another suggests that fiduciaries should balance the pursuit of client
interests against justice and social welfare.
Finally, a gaping moral loophole is created if it is morally permissible (much
less required) for a fiduciary agent to do a wrong action simply because it is in
the client's interest. An attorney could commit a wrong action with complete
moral impunity by the simple expedient of finding a client who has an interest in
the wrong action. I cannot absolve myself of blame for murdering my cousin for
his inheritance simply by having my brother, who also inherits under my cousin's
will, become my client. While murder lies beyond the bounds of fiduciary duties,
the point applies equally to lesser transgressions.
While these arguments seem to bear some weight, it seems clear that
fiduciary ties also bear moral weight. The situation is akin to ordinary promising.
A householder agrees to keep confidential what her neighbor is about to tell her.
The neighbor reveals something about which it would ordinarily be wrong to
keep silent. The wrongness of keeping silent and the wrongness of betraying the
promise must be balanced. Fidelity is at the heart of both promise-keeping and
benefiting the client of a fiduciary relationship, and fidelity is of considerable
moral importance. While respecting the call of fidelity outweighs some wrongs,
fidelity has its limits. Few moral theorists urge keeping a promise to commit
murder or perform other egregious moral wrongs. Balancing the importance of
fidelity against other moral considerations appears to be the correct response.
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III. TEST CASES
In addition to these general arguments, it is helpful to look at particular cases.
As Rawls notes, reflective equilibrium requires balancing arguments for general
principles against the intuitive correctness of the results." Several cases seem to
suggest the need for tempering zealous duties. In any case, these examples
suggest the difficulty of resolving all troubling cases by a simple set of rules.
Case 1: Cross Examination and Harm to Third Parties:
Attorney William Smith represents T. Cox, accused of robbing a small
grocery store. The main witness against Cox is Samantha Jones, who
claims to have seen Cox emerging from the grocery store, brandishing a
gun, on the night of the robbery.
IA. Smith discovers that Ms. Jones gave a housewarming party, during
the course of which she conducted a tour of her house. Jones has been
ruled a hostile witness and instructed to answer Smith's questions "yes or
no." Hoping that at least one jury member may irrationally place less
confidence in Jones' testimony if that jury member believes Jones is
promiscuous, Smith can test Jones' recollection during cross examination
by sneeringly asking Jones about each male member of the house tour
and whether he has ever been in Jones' bedroom, falsely creating the
impression that Jones is promiscuous. While the prosecution can bring
out on redirect that the various males were in Jones' bedroom as part of a
house tour, some damage to Jones' credibility may remain in the mind of
at least one juror. Does the slim possibility of helping his client in this
way justify Smith's deceptively humiliating and embarrassing Jones and
creating a false, detrimental public perception?"
lB. Smith discovers that Jones was babysitting three-year-old Kevin,
who accidentally killed his older brother while Jones was in the
bathroom. Jones was held not to have been at fault. The true nature of
what happened has been kept from Kevin, who is now ten years old. The
trial is televised on a local cable station. It is conceivable that bringing
out Jones' role in the accident seven years ago might possibly,
irrationally, create some disfavor toward Jones in the mind of a juror.46
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45. Although Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 403 would permit the judge to decide to exclude this line
of evidence on the grounds of creating an unfair prejudice, the rule is meant to protect litigants rather than
witnesses. FRE 403 weighs unfairness in the outcome of the case, not unfairness to the witnesses. "'Unfair
prejudice' within its context means an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis .... FED. R.
EVID. 403 advisory committee's note.
46. Kevin's guardians are unlikely to know in advance that the damaging testimony will arise, and the
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Discussion: When X brings suit against Y, it can be argued that X should expect
to undergo unpleasant cross examination: X benefits from the suit, if successful,
and X made the decision to institute proceedings. Thus, it might be argued, by
bringing suit, X renders himself liable to the unpleasant effects of zealous cross
examination. By contrast, Jones and Kevin are innocent third parties. Jones has
no connection to the crime other than walking down the street at the time of the
incident, has nothing to gain from the action against Cox, and had no direct voice
in the decision to institute proceedings. Jones is merely doing her civic duty.
Kevin has no connection to the crime and neither a voice in initiating nor
something to gain from the action against Cox. Jones is an adult; the harm to her,
while upsetting, is of a kind that most adults can handle, and Jones did agree to
take the stand. Kevin is only ten. Most ten year olds would be severely
traumatized by learning that they had killed a sibling. Kevin was offered no
choice at all about becoming involved in the trial.
Arguably, if Cox is in fact innocent, he is entitled to use all available means
to fight unmerited imprisonment. Must he forego even a remote possibility of
avoiding unearned incarceration in order to avoid embarrassing Jones? And is not
every defendant entitled to be presumed innocent until proven guilty? Yet it does
seem that the price an innocent citizen must pay to do her civic duty should not
be unmerited public humiliation and disrepute. It does seem that something has
gone wrong when an innocent child is deeply traumatized for the sake of a
nugatory advantage. Is there no role in such cases for moral judgment? Is a "one
size fits all" approach preferable?
In general, the American legal system poorly protects the interests of third
parties, who are not represented by those who control the action and whose needs
and interests, however urgent, are, on the prevailing conception, entirely
subservient to even the slightest advantage to be gained by clients represented by
attorneys conducting the action.
Case 2: Insurance and False Diagnosis:
Therapist Rodriguez sees Herbert and Mary Carp, whose marriage is
deeply troubled but, Rodriquez believes, salvageable with therapy. The
Carps' insurance covers treatment for depression but does not cover
marital therapy. The Carps cannot afford therapy out of pocket. After
explaining the situation to the Carps, Rodriguez enters on the insurance
form for Herbert Carp a diagnosis of depression.
Discussion: It is quite common for therapists and other medical and mental health
providers to "adjust" diagnoses to fit applicable insurance, believing that, in so
court is unlikely to be familiar with Kevin's situation and anticipate the possible harm to Kevin. Without some
action on the part of the defense attorney, steps to prevent the airing of the damaging information are unlikely to
be taken. Explaining the situation to the court in advance is unlikely to advance Cox's interests and may
conceivably be detrimental to them.
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doing, they are acting justifiably in the best interests of their clients/patients.
Some therapists also adjust their diagnoses to accommodate clients' wish to
receive the least "toxic" covered diagnosis. Few would heartily commend a
therapist or medical provider who refused to make even the slightest adjustment
of diagnosis to permit a patient or client to receive genuinely needed care. While,
in some sense, such actions constitute fraud, providers often feel that insurance
rules are arbitrary and unfair, are formulated to increase the profits of insurers,
and interfere with the proper practice of their fields. Rodriguez, no doubt, feels
that she is simply keeping a technicality from preventing the Carps from
receiving the therapy they need and that, as the Carps' fiduciary, it is her
responsibility to do so.
In fact, the situation is more complex. While insurance rules may often be
arbitrary, if insurance companies as a group must pay more, they will charge
more. The increased cost is typically passed on to the general public. For
example, if the Carps' insurance is provided by the dairy company that employs
Mary Carp, some of the cost of the Carps' treatment is ultimately included in the
price of dairy products that consumers purchase. If the same insurance company
also insures General Motors, some of the cost may be reflected in the price of
GM cars. In general, the interconnectedness of the economy means that,
ultimately, the cost is indirectly spread to everyone. Is everyone, from inner city
single mothers to West Virginia coal miners, required to pay for the Carps'
marital therapy?
More generally, we cannot afford to give everyone ideal care. Medical care
always balances ideal care against cost. To give a moderate example, when a
wealthy patient presents with a urethral infection, a culture is taken before the
patient is given a course of antibiotics, at the end of which a second culture is
taken. In poorer areas, patients are simply prescribed an antibiotic and told to
return if the symptoms persist. The disparity in other instances is more extreme.
Providing ideal medical care for everyone would require sacrifice of virtually all
our resources, leaving little or nothing for education, for instance. Unattractive as
it sounds, some mechanism is absolutely essential for providing less than ideal
medical care for some patients. If physicians regard themselves as fiduciaries for
their patients, seeking the best care for each patient regardless of social cost, then
society cannot trust physicians, who must be closely overseen and regulated. As
this happens more and more, physicians increasingly protest that they are being
prevented from practicing good medicine. Ironically, this protested situation is
the unavoidable consequence of physician behavior, guided by the prevailing
conception of fiduciary duties.
Case 3: Physicians and the allocation of scarce medical resources:
The prevailing fiduciary conception, if taken seriously, requires
physicians to become single-minded advocates for their patients in
medical allocation decisions. After all, if Dr. A is dedicated to benefiting
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his client C over all others, and Dr. B is dedicated to benefiting her client
D over all others, and C and D both need the only available kidney
dialysis machine, Dr. A must be dedicated to doing his best to ensure that
it is C who receives the treatment while Dr. B must be dedicated to doing
her best to ensure that it is D who receives the treatment.
Discussion: While Dr. A should be not indifferent about whether it is C or D who
receives treatment, a system of this sort is objectionable on several grounds. In
such a system, the patient who receives treatment is the patient whose physician
is best able to manipulate the system, a ground of allocation objectionable in
almost every way. While similar things have been said about the legal system, it
should be noted that while attorneys are chosen on the basis of their legal skills,
physicians are not chosen on the basis of their political skill, and relatively little
information about physicians' skill in this area is available to patients. Moreover,
while attorneys' clients generally have the opportunity to speak for themselves, if
they choose, before adjudicators such as magistrates and juries, patients needing
medical resources are rarely able to address adjudicators directly. Thus patients
would be totally dependent upon the unknown political (rather than medical)
skills of their physicians in a way that litigants and defendants are not totally
dependent upon the legal skills of their attorneys.
By contrast, under the Dual-Investor model, which suggests that Dr. A and
Dr. B must balance their dedication to their patients against fairness and public
welfare, Dr. A and Dr. B should bear some concern that the dialysis machine is
fairly allocated.
Case 4: Physicians and Dangerous Patients:
Williams, a school bus driver, presents to his family doctor, Dr. Chan,
with bronchitis, high blood pressure, and long-term fatigue. Arm
markings and subsequent blood tests give clear evidence of frequent drug
use. Should Dr. Chan notify the school board or other authorities?
Discussion: This case appears analogous, in some respects, to public health
issues concerning communicable diseases and therapists' duty to warn. However,
physicians' traditional duties of confidentiality militate against physicianinitiated contact of and disclosure to outside authorities not explicitly required by
law.4 '7 Dr. Chan would be quite reasonably worried that revealing the information,
on his own initiative, might render him liable. Assuming, for the sake of
discussion, that state law leaves the matter within Dr. Chan's discretion, does the
fiduciary relationship between Dr. Chan and Williams truly override the possible
deaths of a busload of innocent schoolchildren? While a compromise course
47. For an additional argument that medical confidentiality must be balanced by the medical practitioner
against public welfare or other moral considerations, see Richard H.S. Tur, Medical Confidentiality and
Disclosure: Moral Conscience and Legal Constraints, 15 J. APPLIED PHIL. 15 (1998).
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might be to counsel Williams to receive help and suggest that Williams himself
notify the board or other authority and/or stop driving in the interim, such
counseling may be ineffective or take considerable time. Should a fatal, drugrelated accident occur during the time Dr. Chan is attempting to convince
Williams to take these steps, the deaths of the children become, to some extent,
Dr. Chan's responsibility.
Two other cases concerning physician confidentiality, both familiar from the
medical ethics literature, deserve mention. s
Case 5: Physicians' Tacit Participation in Patient Deception:
Sheila Bros needs a kidney transplant. Her parents and siblings are tested
for histocompatibility. Only her father, William Bros, is histocompatible
and able to donate a kidney. William Bros, fearful of the operation and of
losing a kidney, announces to the rest of the family, in the presence of his
physician Dr. Aswan, that he is not histocompatible. The family naturally
construes Dr. Aswan's silence as confirmation of William Bros'
statement.
Case 6: Physicians and Informing Non-Patients:
The Greens, both of Ashkenazy origin, are considering having children.
Rebecca Green is tested by Dr. Gruben for Tay-Sachs and told she has a
recessive gene. Dr. Gruben suggests she inform her siblings, who are
also married and of child-bearing age. Rebecca Green refuses to inform
either her husband or her siblings, informing Dr. Gruben that she will
surreptitiously avoid pregnancy and that her siblings can look out for
themselves.
Other cases deserving consideration can be found in almost every field. For
example, if a managerial accountant becomes aware of a business move that
would save several hundred dollars for the large corporation that employs him
but would result in hundreds of employees losing their pension benefits, should
he inform executives at his corporation of the option, despite the smallness of the
gain to his employer and the severity and extent of the harm?
It seems unlikely that in all of these and other cases, the ethically correct
solution requires the fiduciary to ignore the demands of fairness and the pressing
needs of non-clients. While these few cases give but a small sample of the
diverse range of instances arising across the professions, they suggest it is
unlikely that any rule or sharp principle will draw a satisfactory line limiting
zealous duties. Fiduciary dedication to client welfare, on the one hand, and
fairness, decency, and the needs of non-clients, on the other, must be balanced on
48.
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a case-by-case basis. Relevant factors may be identified that assist in making a
reasonable decision. Case 1, for example, suggests that one relevant factor is the
extent to which adversely affected third parties had a choice about becoming
involved. The fact that Kevin had no choice makes the harm to him count more
than it would had Kevin had some choice about becoming involved. But no
related rule can be used to decide cases. It is untenable to insist that the interests
of any third party who did have a choice about becoming involved deserve no
consideration or that the interests of any third party who did not have a choice
deserve consideration equal to the client's interests. In short, cases like those
above call for what The Ethical Engineer dubs "reason-guided casuistry," that is,
articulating a corpus of relevant (though not necessarily decisive) factors and
then giving reasons for thinking that, in the instant case, some of those factors are
more pertinent than others.49
The approach called for by the prevailing conception, that fiduciaries pursue
client advantage in all ways not specifically excepted by a clear rule of law,
seems ill-suited to these cases.
IV. TRENDS AND RAMIFICATIONS
The growth of zealous duties in law and the ethics literature is not an isolated
phenomenon: it reflects some broader trends in law and American society. ° If
there is moral reason to wish to resist the prevailing conception of fiduciary
relationships, then there is at least some reason to consider addressing those
aspects of law and society that support the prevailing conception.
The law has increasingly assumed the task of defining fiduciary relationships
across the professions, in part because an increasingly litigious society has forced
courts to do so. For example, individual therapists, influenced by their
professional organizations and the shared morality of their field, used to decide
whether to warn others when clients or patients posed a danger to themselves or
to others. The Tarasoff case, 5 a civil suit, brought the duty to warn squarely
under the sway of courts. In thinking about fiduciary relationships in therapy,
medicine, real estate, and so forth, jurists begin their thinking, implicitly or
explicitly, by reflecting on the most prominent fiduciary relationship in their own
field, the attorney-client relationship. Most judges and legislators have been
attorneys, and it would be unrealistic to expect a judge or legislator who had
spent many years as an attorney to ignore that experience entirely when thinking
about medical or financial fiduciaries. As a result, the attorney-client relationship
has increasingly become the paradigm for fiduciary relationships across the
professions.
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In turn, the attorney-client relationship, at least in the United States, has
shifted dramatically over the past hundred years in the direction of zealous
duties. The obligation of the attorney to balance, as an officer of the court, the
demands of justice against client interests for which he or she is an advocate all
but disappeared from American legal ethics," although recent years have seen
some amelioration of this trend. Four broad trends may be cited in explaining this
shift.
A. The CulturalLoss of Faith in Justice and Reason
Balancing client interests with the demands of justice and public welfare has
traditionally depended on confidence in the integrity of the notion of justice;
confidence in our ability to discern, however fallibly, its dictates; and confidence
that reason can assist in discovering a genuinely reasonable compromise. The
increasing influence of postmodernism, relativism, skepticism, and antiintellectualism in American life and attitudes has resulted in wide-scale erosion
of confidence in the very notion of justice, in our ability to discover moral truth,
and in the possibility of finding a reasoned compromise. Thus the traditional
ethical task of the attorney has increasingly come to be seen as impossible or
hopelessly arbitrary.
B. The Disadvantageof Hiring an Attorney with Scruples
The traditional requirement that attorneys balance client interest against
justice has meant that clients with unscrupulous attorneys gained an advantage
over clients with more scrupulous attorneys, thus giving attorneys with fewer
compunctions a market advantage over their more fastidious colleagues.
Conscientious attorneys felt squeezed between their consciences and market
pressure to pursue client advantage in every possible way. Current ABA Model
Rules, by requiring zealous duties, require conscientious attorneys to use many of
the same methods of pursuing client advantage that, in a past age, were employed
by unscrupulous attorneys, thus erasing the difference.
C. A Shift in Law Toward Rules Over Discretion
As noted in Part I, balancing justice and client interest is a matter of
exercising discretion. In contrast, the prevailing notion lends itself to rules that

52. See HAZARD, supra note 50, at 15-43. This was written during the zenith of zealous advocacy in the
law. The few exceptions at that time tended either to protect attorneys, such as the permission to divulge
confidential information in order to collect a fee or defend against a charge of misconduct, or were easily
circumvented. For example, an attorney can circumvent the requirement not to suborn perjury by allowing her
client to tell her or his story only after she has explained the advantages of telling story X. See supra note 38
(illustrating that exceptions in various states have since been broadened).
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specify the limits of fiduciaries' zealous pursuit of client interests. Three features
of the legal landscape in America have favored the dominance of rules over the
use of discretion.
a) The increasing corporatisation of law firms. Judicious balancing of
conflicting duties seems most feasible when the model of legal
practice is that of a single decision-maker, as is the case in a singleattorney practice or in a firm in which cases are given to individual,
largely autonomous attorneys. When major decisions are centralized,
rules must play a larger role, since committees or executives can lay
down rules governing numerous subordinates but cannot make
individual discretionary decisions for large numbers of subordinates.
The trend in American law firms has been away from single lawyer
firms and away from attorneys within a firm practicing as autonomous agents toward larger size, centralization, and committee
handling of or oversight of cases. As a result, rules better suit many
modem law firms.
b) The centrality in modem law of anti-discrimination issues. The use
of discretion is subject to abuse and discrimination while the use of
rigid rules frequently defies common sense. Good law thus requires
finding a workable balance between rules and discretion. In recent
years, the importance in American litigation and judicial reasoning
of avoiding discrimination has tended to favor the use of rules over
the use of judgment, discretion, and common sense.
c) The stricter enforcement of ethics. In the past, ethics (apart from the
most serious violations) were often considered the personal province
of individuals and not the concern of law or other enforcement
mechanisms. Clients had little recourse other than choosing
fiduciaries carefully. Over time, the law and other enforcement
mechanisms, such as censure by professional organizations, took
increasing cognizance of ethics. While lax enforcement meant that
fiduciaries were, in practice, free to pursue client advantage at the
expense of justice and social welfare, strict enforcement forced the
law to choose between requiring zealous duties or proscribing them.
The principle of nulla poena sine lege required ethical obligations to
be spelled out in increasing detail, favoring detailed rules over the
use of discretion.
These factors exert continuing pressure toward the adoption of zealous duties
in law and moral thinking. Pragmatically, then, the adoption of a Dual-Investor
model of fiduciary relationships suggests countering these tendencies to some
extent. It must be emphasized that the issue concerns adjusting the balance rather
than radically reversing course. It would be wrong to erase all the progress made
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in anti-discrimination law by eliminating rules in favor of unfettered discretion,
but perhaps some correction is needed in the delicate balance between discretion
and rules. It would be ill-advised to turn the practice of law into a field of
independent and unregulated gladiators, but modern law firms may need to
restore some greater measure of autonomy to attorneys within the firm. No one
would sensibly urge a return to the days of legal neglect of egregious wrongs for
which there was no remedy, but perhaps the law has gone too far in the direction
of defining fiduciary obligations and enforcing ethics. Without returning to a
Spinozistic conception of ethical thinking as a species of geometrical reasoning,
relief from facile relativism and skepticism seems long overdue.
Finally, adopting a Dual-Investor model of fiduciary relationships helps the
virtue of responsibility regain a more prominent place in our moral landscape.
The prevailing view conceptualizes the fiduciary largely as an extension of the
individual client's will, emphasizing client autonomy and self-interest almost
exclusively, at the expense of social and institutional responsibilities. The DualInvestor model balances client autonomy and welfare against the social
responsibilities of both individual clients and practitioners as well as the
institutional responsibilities of the profession as a whole. Fiduciary relationships
are but one small part of the moral picture, but, in the age of Enron, any
significant step toward inculcating responsibility is a welcome one.

